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Abstract
Automatic Speaker Verification systems are gaining popularity
these days; spoofing attacks are of prime concern as they make
these systems vulnerable. Some spoofing attacks like Replay
attacks are easier to implement but are very hard to detect thus
creating the need for suitable countermeasures. In this paper, we
propose a speech classifier based on deep-convolutional neural
network to detect spoofing attacks. Our proposed methodology
uses acoustic time-frequency representation of power spectral
densities on Mel frequency scale (Mel-spectrogram), via deep
residual learning (an adaptation of ResNet-34 architecture). Us-
ing a single model system, we have achieved an equal error rate
(EER) of 0.9056% on the development and 5.32% on the eval-
uation dataset of logical access scenario and an equal error rate
(EER) of 5.87% on the development and 5.74% on the evalua-
tion dataset of physical access scenario of ASVspoof 2019.
Index Terms: Spoofing detection, Mel-Spectrogram, Deep-
Convolutional Neural Network
1. Introduction
Biometrics technologies play a critical role in regulating access
to informational resources in today's world. One of the reliable
approaches for attaining a suitable secure system is speaker ver-
ification.
Automatic speaker verification (ASV) has undergone rapid
improvements in the recent decade but continues to show
high vulnerability towards different spoofing attacks. Spoofing
methods are categorized as speech synthesis (SS), voice conver-
sion (VC), impersonation and replay attacks [1]. Among these,
replay attacks are arguably the most simple yet highly indistin-
guishable ASV spoofing technique as they do not require the at-
tackers to have any specialized knowledge, and can be mounted
with relative ease using consumer devices.
For the first automatic speaker verification spoofing and
counter-measures challenge (ASVspoof 2015 [2]) even though
the best results showed an overall average detection EER of less
than 1.5%, the EER of unknown attacks is five times higher than
that of known attacks. In addition, while some attacks were eas-
ily and consistently detected, others provoked extremely high
error rates nearing 50%.
Systems submitted under ASVspoof 2017 [3] challenge in-
spected distinct front-end features and the usage of various
classifiers to detect replay attack under conditions. Among
them, the best-performing system [4], had an equal error rate
(EER) of 6.73% and used a light convolutional neural network
(LCNN) to extract high-level features from the log power spec-
trum, together with a Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) as clas-
sifier. Variable length Teager energy operator-energy separation
algorithm-instantaneous frequency cosine coefficients (VESA-
IFCCs) [5] were proposed as a single system with the aim of
capturing the spectral changes due to the transmission and chan-
nel characteristic of replay devices. A single frequency filtering
feature with a high spectro-temporal resolution was proposed
[6] to capture the channel information embedded in the low sig-
nal to noise ratio region.
ASVspoof 2019 [7] Challenge was organized to empha-
size the development of reliable countermeasures that could
efficiently segregate bona fide and spoofed speech. The ini-
tiative aims specifically to encourage the design of general-
ized countermeasures, i.e. countermeasures that would per-
form well when encountered with spoofing attacks which are
unpredictable in nature. The data used for ASVspoof 2015
[2] contained spoofed speech samples generated using text-to-
speech (TTS) and voice conversion (VC) systems at that time.
The ASVspoof 2017 [3] challenge emphasized on the design
of countermeasures strived at detecting replay spoofing attacks
that could be implemented easily by anyone using conventional
devices. The ASVspoof 2019 [7] edition was the first to focus
on countermeasures for all three major spoofing attack types,
namely those originating from TTS, VC and replay attacks.
ASVspoof 2019 [7] focuses to develop next-generation counter-
measures for the automatic detection of spoofed or fake audio.
The challenge encloses two separate sub-challenges in logical
and physical access control and provides a common database
of the most advanced spoofing attacks to date. The aim was to
study the extremities of spoofing countermeasures with respect
to automatic speaker verification and spoofed audio detection.
In this paper, we propose the use of Mel-spectrograms [8]
which is obtained from the audio frames as a time-frequency
representation of power spectral density, for the training of
deep-convolutional neural networks for audio spoofing attack
detection. The use of Mel-spectrograms provides a time-
frequency representation with sufficient spectral resolution,
which is required for robust replay attack detection. Our frame-
work is based on adapting the ResNet-34 architecture [9].
2. Methodology
Our proposed framework (Figure 1) employs transfer learning
[10] of a pre-trained convolutional neural network (CNN) for
fast adaptation to the Mel-spectrograms extracted from speech
inputs. Transfer learning is an analysis technique in machine
learning that used to solve a problem by reusing knowledge
gained from solving another but similar problem. Extracted
spectrograms are fed into the deep convolutional neural net-
work in which the speech signals are classified as bona fide or
spoofed. In the following subsections, we describe the three
major components of our system: Transfer Learning [10], Mel-
spectrograms [8] and ResNet [9], followed by a functional
overview of our proposed framework.
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Figure 1: Overview of the proposed framework for speech
spoofing detection.
Figure 2: Mel-spectrogram of an audio.
2.1. Transfer Learning
Transfer Learning is a machine learning technique that is used
to solve a problem based on knowledge gained from solving an-
other but related problem. In this approach, the features gained
from training a base neural network is reused or adjusted to
a target neural network for its training. Transfer learning is
usually expressed through the use of pre-trained models. A
pre-trained model is trained using a large benchmark dataset
to solve a similar problem. The computational cost of training
such models is high, So it is common practice to reuse mod-
els from published literature (e.g. VGG, Inception, MobileNet,
ResNet). Pre-trained models used in transfer learning are usu-
ally based on large convolutional neural networks (CNN). High
performance and the easiness in training are two of the main
factors that makes CNN popular for such applications.
2.2. Mel-spectrograms
A Mel-spectrogram represents an acoustic time-frequency rep-
resentation of a sound, i.e. the power spectral density P (f, t).
It is sampled into a number of points at equal intervals of time
ti and frequencies f j (on a Mel frequency scale).
The Mel-frequency scale is defined as:
Mel = 2595log10(1 +
Hertz
700
) (1)
And its inverse is:
Hertz = 700(10
Mel
2595 − 1) (2)
STFT (short-time Fourier transform) and Mel-spectrogram have
been the most popular input representations for audio classifi-
cations [8]. Mel-spectrograms provide an efficient and percep-
tually relevant representation compared to STFT [11] and have
been shown to perform well in various tasks [12]-[16]. How-
ever, an STFT is closer to the original signal and neural net-
works may be able to learn a representation that is more op-
timal to the given task than Mel-spectrograms. The latter re-
quires large amount of training data; however as reported in
[17] where using Mel-spectrograms outperformed STFT with a
smaller dataset.
Mel-spectrogram transforms the input raw sequence to a 2-
D feature map where one of the dimensions represents time and
Figure 3: Residual learning: a building block [9].
the other one represents frequency and the values represent am-
plitude. The above Figure 2 shows the Mel-spectrogram of an
audio signal. 2-D Mel Model betters the 1-D raw wave model
but the average of the two outperforms each individual model
significantly [18]. The Mel-spectrogram is selected since it is
psychologically relevant and computationally efficient. It pro-
duces a Mel-scaled frequency representation which is a more
appropriate conjecture of human auditory understanding [11]
and typically involves compressing the frequency axis of short-
time Fourier transform representation. And the magnitude of
Mel-spectrogram is mapped to the decibel scale.
2.3. Deep Residual Net (ResNet)
The deeper the Neural Network the more difficult it is to train. It
is well known that the depth of a network is a determining factor
of the network performance. Deeper neural networks are used
in the field of computer vision. However, it is not easy to train
a deeper network due to the notorious gradient vanishing prob-
lem. This was one of the drawbacks of VGG net [19] as they
started losing generalization capability after some depth. To ad-
dress this problem, an effective method called residual neural
network(ResNet)[9] is introduced. ResNet provides a training
framework to ease the training of networks that are substan-
tially deeper than those used previously. It was motivated by the
counter intuitive experimental findings that adding more layers
lead to higher training error. Theoretically, as the number of lay-
ers increased, the modeling capabilities of the Neural Networks
should be better and therefore, the deeper networks should pro-
duce no higher training error. Experiments in [9] showed that
ResNet greatly improves training efficiency since the gradients
can propagate many layers through the shortcut connection. In
addition, ResNet allows deeper networks to be trained, result-
ing in models that usually perform better. One of the problems
ResNets solves is known as the vanishing gradient. This is be-
cause when the network is too deep, the gradients from where
the loss function is calculated easily shrink to zero after several
applications of the chain rule. This results in the weights never
getting updated and therefore, no learning process is involved.
With ResNets, the gradients flow directly through the identity
function.
Deep residual learning [9] enables the training of CNNs
that have substantially deeper architectures. It introduces skip
connections that enable gradient flow across a large number of
layers thus relieves the problem of vanishing gradients in deep
CNNs. These skip connections enables the outputs to learn a
residual mapping. The residual block forms the basic build-
ing block of a ResNet (Figure 3). If the desired mapping to be
learned is H(x), the stacked residual layers learn the residual
mapping, F(x) = H(x) − x. Thus, the original mapping to
be learned becomes F(x)+x. ResNet uses the Rectified linear
unit (ReLU) activation function.
3. Experiments
3.1. Dataset
Table 1: Number of non-overlapping target speakers and num-
ber of utterances in training and development sets of the
ASVspoof 2019 database [20].
Speakers Utterances
Subset Male Female Logical Access Physical Access
Bona fide Spoofed Bona fide Spoofed
Training 8 12 2,580 22,800 5,400 48,600
Development 8 12 2,548 22,296 5,400 24,300
3.1.1. Data Conditions: Logical Access
Logical access includes spoofing attacks generated with text-
to-speech (TTS) and voice conversion (VC) attacks. Genuine
speech is collected from speakers with no significant channel
or background noise effects. Spoofed speech is generated from
genuine data using a number of possible spoofing algorithms.
The full dataset is split into three subsets, the first one is for
training, the second is for development and the third is for eval-
uation. The number of speakers in the former two subsets is
illustrated in Table 1. There is no speaker overlap in these
three subsets regarding target speakers used in voice conver-
sion or TTS technique. The voice conversion systems are based
on (1) neural-network-based and (2) transfer-function-based
methods. The speech synthesis systems were done with (1)
waveform concatenation, (2) neural-network-based parametric
speech synthesis using source-filter vocoders and (3) neural-
network-based parametric speech synthesis using Wavenet.
3.1.2. Data Conditions: Physical Access
The spoofing attacks that at the sensor level are considered
as physical access scenario. Both bona fide and spoofed sig-
nals propagate through a physical space prior to the acquisition.
Spoofing attacks in this scenario are therefore referred to as re-
play attacks, whereby are cording of a bona fide access attempt
is first captured, presumably surreptitiously, before being re-
played to the ASV microphone.
Table 1 shows the number of speakers and the number of
bona fide and replay spoofing access attempts (utterances) in
and development set. Both bona fide and replay spoofing ac-
cess attempts in both training and development data partitions
were generated with respect to the same set of randomly se-
lected acoustic and replay configurations.
In a similar fashion to the logical access scenario, the eval-
uation set is disjoint in terms of speakers. Evaluation data
is generated in the same manner as training and development
data, albeit with different, randomly acoustic and replay con-
figurations. Specifically, the set of room sizes, levels of re-
verberation, speaker-to-ASV microphone distances, attacker-
to-speaker recording distances, and loudspeaker qualities, while
drawn from the same categories, will be different. Full details
of the dataset and performance measures of ASVspoof 2019 are
presented in evaluation plan [20].
3.2. Performance measures
Improvements in Countermeasure (CM) technology need not
necessarily imply an improved complete system that involves
co-operation of CM and ASV. Thus, the main focus is on assess-
ment of tandem systems where the CM act as a ‘mediator’ to
determine whether a given speech input originates from a bona
fide (genuine) user, before passing it as the main biometric ver-
ifier (the ASV system). The cost function used in this scenario
is a recently-proposed tandem detection cost function (t-DCF)
[21] as its primary performance metric. Other than t-DCF, the
evaluation of the equal error rate (EER) of each submitted coun-
termeasure is used as a secondary performance metric [20].
3.2.1. Tandem-Detection Cost Function (t-DCF)
The t-DCF [21] is mainly consisted of statistical detection the-
ory and involves detailed specification of a specified applica-
tion. A key feature of t-DCF involves the assessment of a tan-
dem system while on the other hand, keeping the two subsys-
tems (CM and ASV) isolated from each other, i.e. they can be
developed independently of each other.
The t-DCF metric has 6 parameters: (i) false alarm and miss
costs for both systems, and (ii) prior probabilities of target and
spoof trials (with an implied third, non-target prior).
t−DCF (s) = C1P cmmiss(s) + C2P cmfa (s) (3)
where P cmmiss(s) and P
cm
fa (s) are, respectively, the miss rate and
the false alarm rate of the CM system at threshold s. The con-
stants C2 and C1 are dictated by the t-DCF costs, priors, and the
ASV system detection errors.
3.2.2. Equal Error Rate (EER)
In scoring-based spoofing detection tasks, EER is used as a sec-
ondary metric to analyze the performance of different counter
measures methods. Let FRR(θ) and FAR(θ) denote the false
rejection rate and false acceptance rate at threshold θ.
FAR(θ) =
count(spoof trials with score) > θ
total spoof trials
(4)
FRR(θ) =
count(human trials with score) < θ
total human trials
(5)
FRR(θ) and FAR(θ) are monotonically decreasing and
increasing functions of θ. The EER corresponds to the threshold
θEER at which two detection error rates are equal.
3.3. Model Setup
Our model was trained only on the training set and validated on
the development set of the ASVspoof 2019 dataset. The model
was trained in Google Colab with the granted GPU (Tesla K80).
Audio preprocessing was performed via the Google Cloud Plat-
form. Python’s fastai library was used to train CNN which pro-
vides support for vision, text, tabular, and collaborative filter-
ing models. The fastai library is a high-level library build on
PyTorch which enables easy prototyping and gives you access
to a lot of state-of-the-art methods such as marketing applica-
tion (horizontal application) and health care application (ver-
tical application). Mel-spectrograms were extracted from the
audio files using FFT window of size 2048 and the number
of samples between successive frames was taken as 512. The
Mel-spectrograms were further resized to 224x224 before feed-
ing into the CNN. ResNet-34 training ran on Google Colab with
ADAM optimizer and a learning rate in range of 0.000001, over
8 epochs and a batch size of 64.
Table 2: The experiment result obtained from ASVspoof 2019.
Dataset EER t-DCF
Development Evaluation Development Evaluation
Logical Access 0.9056 5.32 - 0.1514
Physical Access 5.87 5.74 - 0.1351
Table 3: The experiment result of baseline in ASVspoof 2019.
Baseline
Implementation
Logical Access Physical Access
EER t-DCF EER t-DCF
CQCC - GMM 9.57 0.2366 11.04 0.2454
LFCC - GMM 8.09 0.2116 13.54 0.3017
4. Results and Discussion
Table 2 shows the result of our model in ASVspoof 2019 chal-
lenge based on the two performance matrices (t-DCF and EER)
on evaluation and development dataset. Comparing the result
of ASVspoof 2019 challenge, our single model outperforms the
baseline models provided by ASVspoof 2019 organizers given
in Table 3. But when compared to other teams, the result that
we obtained in the testing phase was low. We had investigated
the reason behind this problem and found that in the test dataset,
spoofed data are generated according to diverse unseen spoof-
ing algorithms. However, they are variations of the spoofing
algorithms used to generate the development dataset.
Among the systems submitted under ASVspoof 2019 chal-
lenge, the best-performing system under logical access sce-
nario, had a min-tDCF of 0.2093 and an equal error rate (EER)
of 11.40% (while evaluating a single system). By comparing
this with our single system, we had obtained a better result in
both the performance metrics. Along with that, while analyzing
the result and spoofing attack algorithms provided by ASVspoof
2019 committee, our model performed well in detecting spoof-
ing attacks which uses voice conversion techniques by wave-
form filtering (A17). In both logical and physical access sce-
nario, we are one among the top three teams while considering
both primary and single system as same. We had proposed the
same methodology, rather than going for different methodolo-
gies to counter both logical and physical access scenarios. Also,
t-DCF and EER showed correlation of 0.99686 and 0.96886 in
physical and logical access scenarios respectively.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we explored the applicability of the transfer learn-
ing approach for the solution to the problem of spoofing de-
tection. Our first finding is that, instead of feeding raw audio
directly to the model, we use an advanced approach to audio
classification using Mel-spectrogram. Mel-spectrogram trans-
forms the input raw sequence to a 2-D feature map in which one
dimension represents time and the other represents frequency
and the values represent amplitude. A second finding is that
residual neural networks can help us build deeper models that
outperform conventional deep neural networks.
Finally, we demonstrated that even with a single model, bet-
ter system performance can be obtained. By using different
features and models system performance can be significantly
improved. In future, we would like to explore the effectiveness
of using more advanced generative adversarial networks (GAN)
for the spoofing detection task. Denoising methods like Adap-
tive filtering and Autoencoders could also be implemented.
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